North Korea Showdown
posted by Bob Clasen
from the San Diego Tribune
By Robert J. Caldwell
February 13, 2005
North Korea's stunning proclamation that it possesses nuclear weapons and is withdrawing from the six-party negotiations intended to halt its nuclear program is unquestionably a scary moment for the world. That's exactly what those who rule the world's most frighteningly totalitarian communist state intended.
All the more reason, then, for the United States and North Korea's neighbors to react, first, by resolving that illegal, provocative behavior will not be rewarded.
North Korea is a signatory nation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forbids the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1994, North Korea also signed the Agreed Framework, a bilateral pact with the United States, which required the North Koreans to freeze their nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance to their impoverished economy.
Yet, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the NPT in 2002 and expelled inspectors from the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. That same year, the Bush administration accused the North Koreans of violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program. Now we know, with as much certainty as possible when dealing with obsessively secretive North Korea, that it was, indeed, violating its pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, the great likelihood is that North Korea has been secretly working on building a nuclear weapons capability since the early 1990s, if not before.
So, what do we do about it?
Answering that question begins with understanding why North Korea chose to defy the world, violate the international agreements it signed, and become a nuclear power.
No doubt the North Koreans understand full well that any actual use of nuclear weapons against South Korea or U.S. forces stationed there – or any attack with conventional weapons, for that matter – would be sheer suicide. American diplomats have long since passed the word privately to the North Koreans that their regime would not survive a resumption of armed aggression against South Korea. Any second Korean War would end in a unified Korea governed by America's allies in Seoul.
The presumption, then, is that North Korea and its "dear leader," the pathologically strange Kim Jong Il, want the crude, minimalist nuclear arsenal they could build as the ultimate survival insurance for the regime in Pyongyang.
With a broken economy unable even to feed its own people – an estimated 2 million North Koreans died of starvation during the 1990s – and almost completely isolated from the rest of the world, the regime may well be growing increasingly desperate. The rumored internal divisions within North Korea's leadership coupled with Kim's erratic, ineffectual rule may be compounding Pyongyang's sense of desperation.
A handful of rudimentary nuclear weapons, even if untested and without proper delivery systems, can still seem the ultimate equalizer for an isolated, bankrupt regime lacking any other form of diplomatic leverage. North Korea's more immediate motive for declaring itself nuclear armed is undoubtedly to rewrite the rules of a regional diplomacy it cannot dominate.
Under both Kim and his late father, Kim Il Sung, North Korea has always wanted to negotiate directly with the United States, cutting out a South Korean government that the North Koreans regard as a mere puppet of the Americans. Every American administration since the Korean War has, wisely, rebuffed this transparent ploy.
The six-party negotiations involving North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States were organized under American sponsorship to prevent, or at least contain, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Predictably, the North Koreans combined their declaration of nuclear-weapons status with withdrawal from the six-party talks and a demand for bilateral negotiations with the United States alone.
That demand was promptly, and correctly, rejected by the Bush administration.
Caving in to the implicit blackmail of North Korea's nuclear weapons would be a catastrophic mistake encouraging still more extortion. The Bush administration's alternative is to mobilize a united front in which China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States all insist that North Korea return to the six-party format. If the North Koreans refuse, it will then be time to serve notice that Pyongyang faces a suspension of all economic aid plus referral of its nuclear violations to the United Nations Security Council for consideration of possible sanctions.
Ultimately, the only permanent solution to the chilling menace of a nuclear-armed North Korea is regime change in Pyongyang; an objective that must now be a priority, however clandestinely pursued, for American foreign policy. Merely hoping that Kim Jong Il doesn't become the source of nukes covertly sold to other rogue states or to, say, Osama bin Laden won't be sufficient.
Caldwell is editor of the Insight section
and can be reached via e-mail at
robert.caldwell@uniontrib.com.
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050213/news_mz1e13caldwe.html
from the San Diego Tribune
By Robert J. Caldwell
February 13, 2005
North Korea's stunning proclamation that it possesses nuclear weapons and is withdrawing from the six-party negotiations intended to halt its nuclear program is unquestionably a scary moment for the world. That's exactly what those who rule the world's most frighteningly totalitarian communist state intended.
All the more reason, then, for the United States and North Korea's neighbors to react, first, by resolving that illegal, provocative behavior will not be rewarded.
North Korea is a signatory nation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which forbids the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1994, North Korea also signed the Agreed Framework, a bilateral pact with the United States, which required the North Koreans to freeze their nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance to their impoverished economy.
Yet, North Korea abruptly withdrew from the NPT in 2002 and expelled inspectors from the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. That same year, the Bush administration accused the North Koreans of violating the Agreed Framework by pursuing a secret nuclear weapons program. Now we know, with as much certainty as possible when dealing with obsessively secretive North Korea, that it was, indeed, violating its pledge not to develop nuclear weapons. In fact, the great likelihood is that North Korea has been secretly working on building a nuclear weapons capability since the early 1990s, if not before.
So, what do we do about it?
Answering that question begins with understanding why North Korea chose to defy the world, violate the international agreements it signed, and become a nuclear power.
No doubt the North Koreans understand full well that any actual use of nuclear weapons against South Korea or U.S. forces stationed there – or any attack with conventional weapons, for that matter – would be sheer suicide. American diplomats have long since passed the word privately to the North Koreans that their regime would not survive a resumption of armed aggression against South Korea. Any second Korean War would end in a unified Korea governed by America's allies in Seoul.
The presumption, then, is that North Korea and its "dear leader," the pathologically strange Kim Jong Il, want the crude, minimalist nuclear arsenal they could build as the ultimate survival insurance for the regime in Pyongyang.
With a broken economy unable even to feed its own people – an estimated 2 million North Koreans died of starvation during the 1990s – and almost completely isolated from the rest of the world, the regime may well be growing increasingly desperate. The rumored internal divisions within North Korea's leadership coupled with Kim's erratic, ineffectual rule may be compounding Pyongyang's sense of desperation.
A handful of rudimentary nuclear weapons, even if untested and without proper delivery systems, can still seem the ultimate equalizer for an isolated, bankrupt regime lacking any other form of diplomatic leverage. North Korea's more immediate motive for declaring itself nuclear armed is undoubtedly to rewrite the rules of a regional diplomacy it cannot dominate.
Under both Kim and his late father, Kim Il Sung, North Korea has always wanted to negotiate directly with the United States, cutting out a South Korean government that the North Koreans regard as a mere puppet of the Americans. Every American administration since the Korean War has, wisely, rebuffed this transparent ploy.
The six-party negotiations involving North Korea, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States were organized under American sponsorship to prevent, or at least contain, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Predictably, the North Koreans combined their declaration of nuclear-weapons status with withdrawal from the six-party talks and a demand for bilateral negotiations with the United States alone.
That demand was promptly, and correctly, rejected by the Bush administration.
Caving in to the implicit blackmail of North Korea's nuclear weapons would be a catastrophic mistake encouraging still more extortion. The Bush administration's alternative is to mobilize a united front in which China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States all insist that North Korea return to the six-party format. If the North Koreans refuse, it will then be time to serve notice that Pyongyang faces a suspension of all economic aid plus referral of its nuclear violations to the United Nations Security Council for consideration of possible sanctions.
Ultimately, the only permanent solution to the chilling menace of a nuclear-armed North Korea is regime change in Pyongyang; an objective that must now be a priority, however clandestinely pursued, for American foreign policy. Merely hoping that Kim Jong Il doesn't become the source of nukes covertly sold to other rogue states or to, say, Osama bin Laden won't be sufficient.
Caldwell is editor of the Insight section
and can be reached via e-mail at
robert.caldwell@uniontrib.com.
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050213/news_mz1e13caldwe.html
Comments
If the bomb gets traced back to N. Korea, won't we retaliate against them with a full strike.
I don't like N.Korea for many reasons, but the term regime change has taken on a new meaning since Iraq. It's a buzz word for the use of military force.